(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible agency on -(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, (ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, (iii) alternatives to the proposed action, (iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and (v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented. Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal official shall consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved.
In addition to the EIS requirement, NEPA requires agencies to apply a "systematic, interdisciplinary approach," including use of environment-related sciences, in taking action that may affect the environment, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(A); to develop procedures, with the assistance of the Council on Environmental Quality, for complying with the statute, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(B); and, whether or not an EIS is required, to consider alternatives to actions that involve "unresolved conflicts concerning alternative uses of available resources." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(E).
11. See F. ANDERSON, supra note 1, at viii. Three primary decisions have been identified.
The first decision is whether the agency action requires an EIS. The second concerns the content and adequacy of an EIS. The third is whether to proceed with or forgo an action based on the tant step in ensuring at least minimal compliance with NEP A's objectives is the threshold decision 12 whether the environmental impact of a proposed action is potentially significant enough to warrant preparation of an EIS. 13 If the agency decides an EIS is necessary, it rigorously balances environmental considerations against each other and against economic and social considerations, detailing its findings in an extensive report -the EIS. 14 If the agency decides that an EIS is not required, 15 NEPA essentially mandates no further consideration of environmental factors, and any significant environmental effects that preparation of an EIS might have revealed remain unknown and unaddressed until they actually cause environmental harm. 16 Judicial review of agency interpretations of NEPA usually involves an analysis of whether the agency has met the EIS requirement. 17 In reviewing agency findings that the environmental impact of an action is not significant enough to require an EIS, the federal courts have developed different approaches. The conflict is one between the First, Second, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits, which review the threshold decision under the Administrative Procedure Act's (APA) 18 "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review, 19 and the Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, which employ a "reasonableness" standard. 20 The District of Columbia Circuit applies a modified "arbitrary and capricious" standard that employs a four-part test. 21 The development of both the reasonableness standard and the arbitrary and capricious standard in the various circuits has yielded review 12. An agency's decision to prepare or not to prepare an EIS is commonly called the "threshold decision" or "threshold determination."
13. An EIS may not be required for reasons other than insignificance of environmental im- 14. The essential elements of an EIS are spelled out in 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982) . See note 10 supra.
15. This decision is termed a "Finding of No Significant Impact" (FONSI) . See note 38 infra and accompanying text.
16. See text accompanying notes 102-07 infra for a discussion of different views on the likelihood of significant impact that should trigger preparation of an EIS.
17. See F. ANDERSON, supra note 1, at 275.
18. 5 u.s.c. § § 701-06 (1982) .
19. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982) [Vol. 85:191 approaches that range from nearly total deference to the agency 22 to almost de novo review by the court. 23 The varying degree of judicial deference given agency threshold decisions may well stem from conflicting application of several Supreme Court decisions and disagreement over whether to characterize the threshold decision as one of fact or law. In addition, courts impose different burdens of proof on an opponent of the agency decision. This Note examines the confused array of judicial approaches for reviewing agency findings of no significant environmental impact and proposes a standardized, comprehensive approach that ensures compliance with both the procedural and substantive aspects of NEPA. 2 4 Part I reviews agency procedures mandated by NEPA which ensure that agencies develop a detailed record for judicial scrutiny and constitute the legal basis against which to check agency threshold decisions. Part II examines the conflicting approaches of the lower courts, emphasizing their reliance on Supreme Court decisions, their characterization of the threshold decision as legal or factual, and the burden of proof each places on opponents of the agency decision.
Part III proposes an intermediate approach toward judicial review that builds upon the District of Columbia Circuit's four-part inquiry. The proposed approach avoids the confusing terminology (such as "arbitrary and capricious" and "reasonableness") that characterizes current review standards. Instead, it prompts courts to make an individual analysis of several interrelated parts of the threshold decision and to adopt a moderate burden of proof for the decision's challengers. The approach thus leads to a less deferential and more in-depth review, which this Note argues is appropriate given that agencies governed by NEPA frequently lack environmental expertise.
I. NEPA PROCEDURES AND THE EIS REQUIREMENT
Congress intended NEPA to have substantive impact on adminis- trative decisionmaking. 25 Rather than requiring agencies to reach statutorily defined goals, however, Congress pursued agency reform through procedural mandates. It recognized that procedures requiring serious consideration of environmental factors will, in some cases, significantly influence administrative decisions. Because NEPA can influence substantive agency decisions only through its procedural mandates, strict agency adherence to those procedures is crucial.
NEPA procedures require preparation of an EIS for every major federal action significantly 26 affecting the quality of the human environment. Unlike most other organic statutes, 27 NEPA applies to all federal agencies. Even development-oriented agencies such as the Army Corps of Engineers are required to consider environmental concerns that may conflict with their primary objectives. 28 For example, the Army Corps of Engineers, one of the oldest and busiest federal agencies, has as its primary objective the building and maintenance of numerous public works projects such as dams and navigational facilities. Often these objectives or the procedures to achieve them are in direct conflict with environmental concerns. See generally D. MAZMANIAN & J. NIENABER, supra note 6, at 8-12. See also Peltz & Weinman, supra note 11, at 89 ("[A]gencies often become carried away with their own abilities and defiantly refuse to comply with laws which they feel might hinder their operation. They may seek to insulate themselves from the law and judicial scrutiny, hiding behind the shield of expertise and a self-proclaimed autonomy.").
29
. See 42 U.S.C. § § 4341-47 (1982 (1982) .
31. 40 C.F.R. § § 1500-08 (1986) . Federal agencies are subject to both the CEQ regulations and any procedures they develop internally for complying with NEPA. See, e.g., 33 C.F.R. Part 230 (1986) (Army Corps of Engineers policy and procedures for implementing NEPA); 40 C.F.R. Part 6 (1986) (similar Environmental Protection Agency regulations). The agency procedures are typically based on the CEQ regulations, but are tailored more closely to the internal operation of the agency. For example, while the CEQ regulations suggest generally that agencies [Vol. 85:191 that are binding on all federal agencies. 32 The CEQ procedures require agencies initially to prepare an Environmental Assessment (EA), a brief3 3 document containing sufficient evidence and analysis for the agency to decide whether an EIS is required. 34 An agency can avoid preparing an EA only if the agency has already "categorically excluded"35 the type of action proposed from those potentially requiring an EIS, if the agency has already decided to prepare an EIS, 36 or if the agency's organic legislation mandates procedures for consideration of environmental factors that are "functional equivalents" of the EIS process. 37 If,. after producing an EA, the agency decides an EIS is unnecessary, it must state the reasons for that decision in a "finding of no significant impact," a document commonly known as a FONSI. EA it prepares supports a FONSI. Nonetheless, while an EA can provide support for a FONSI and a decision not to prepare an EIS, agencies should not attempt to substitute an EA for an EIS if indeed the action is likely to have a significant impact. 39 Unlike an EIS, an EA identifies the presence or absence of potential significant environmental impacts after engaging in only a minimal balancing of environmental, social, economic, and other factors. 40 By contrast, the EIS is a much longer 41 document that studies environmental factors in greater detail and includes extensive balancing of factors. Moreover, it focuses more extensively on alternatives to the action, 42 identifies "irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources" 43 to a project, and provides greater opportunity for comment from other agencies and the public. 44 In sum, an EIS and an EA supporting a FONSI convey to the public significantly different messages. The EA, if it makes accurate findings, suggests that the agency action is environmentally sound in all respects, thereby justifying a relaxed view toward environmental aspects of the action. The EIS, by contrast, acknowledges that the action might result in environmental harm and thus establishes a basis for ongoing environmental sensitivity. Furthermore, because an EIS identifies latent environmental impacts and analyzes existing environ- 42. NEPA mandates discussion of alternatives in both the EIS provision, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982) , and in 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(E) (1982) , which applies to all agency actions, regardless of significant environmental impact, having "unresolved conflicts concerning alternative uses of available resources." An EA may discuss alternatives, and in some cases an agency's internal procedures for compliance with NEPA require such a discussion. See, e.g., 33 C.F.R.
Part 230, App. B, Para. 8.a. (1986) ("[T]he EA shall include a discussion of reasonable alternatives. However, when the EA confirms that the impact of the applicant's proposal is not significant, there are no 'unresolved conflicts concerning alternative uses of available resource [sic] .. .' and the proposed action is a water dependent activity, the EA need not include a discussion on alternatives ... .'').
43. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(v) (1982) . 44. Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 875 (1st Cir. 1985) . Although some outside advice is envisioned under 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(b), the comment period for an EA coupled with a FONSI is limited to thirty days and, in some cases, is not required at all. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(e)(2) (1986). The outside input requirement for an EIS, on the other hand, involves a broad range of participants. See generally 40 C.F.R. Part 1503 (1986). Furthermore, the comment period for a draft EIS is ninety days and for a final EIS thirty days. 40 C.F.R. § 1506.10 (1986).
[Vol. 85:191 mental impacts in much greater detail than an EA, it provides a sounder basis for the exercise of agency discretion regarding the ultimate substantive decision to continue, modify, or even reject the proposed action.
II. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF THE EIS THRESHOLD DECISION
In NEP A's early years, federal courts applied as many as five standards of revieW4 5 to agency decisions not to prepare an EIS. The reasonableness staµdard 46 and the arbitrary and capricious standard 47 are the only ones tliat have survived subsequent judicial refinements, and the development of the respective standards has at times produced inconsistent variations. 48 Many courts, however, have simply concluded that in practice the two standards are the same. 4 9
The difference among the circuits can best be characterized as a dispute over the proper degree of deference due agency threshold decisions. This application of different degrees of deference reflects the courts' fundamental disagreement over the strength of NEPA as an administrative reform statute and on the willingness and ability of di- verse federal agencies to comply adequately with NEP A's procedural mandates. In justifying their positions, courts employ conflicting interpretations of relevant Supreme Court decisions · and disagree whether to characterize the threshold decision as legal or factual. As a result, the courts apply different burdens of proof to challengers of agency FONSis.
The use of Supreme Court decisions is particularly unhelpful in resolving the standard of review conflict. The Supreme Court has not yet come close to examining in detail the issues surrounding the threshold decision or heard persuasive arguments for adopting one approach over others. Similarly, the debate over the characterization of the threshold decison as factual or legal is misdirected . because the decision is concededly one involving both factual and legal elements. 50 Choosing one characterization over the other oversimplifies what should be a careful and detailed judicial analysis. The burden of proof issue is a critical starting point in review of FONSis that deserves a more reasoned resolution than it presently receives. The next three sections examine these factors in tum.
A. Disparate Interpretations of Supreme Court Decisions
Supreme Court cases interpreting NEPA primarily involve agency decisions made in the course of preparing an EIS, 51 or an agency's failure to consider environmental concerns when preparation of an EIS was concededly not at issue. 52 Supreme Court cases that examine the threshold decision not to prepare an EIS focus on whether the EIS provisions of NEPA apply at all to the type of action involved, rather than on the significance of the proposed action's environmental impact. 53 The Court has refused two opportunities to resolve the circuit split over the proper standard of review of an agency's decision not to prepare an EIS. 54 56 courts have applied it to a broad range of administrative actions, relying on its extensive discussion of the scope of review provisions in the Administrative Procedures Act (AP A), 57 particularly the Court's construction of the AP A's arbitrary and capricious standard. The Court in Overton Park established a broad category of actions that "must be set aside if the action was 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law' or if the action failed to meet statutory, procedural, or constitutional requirements." 58 The Court noted that under the arbitrary and capricious standard the agency decision at issue is entitled to a "presumption of regularity." 59 However, it added that dominant significance under certain circumstances, NEPA does not assign a relative weight to environmental concerns and therefore leads the courts to recognize much broader governmental discretion in deciding whether or not those concerns should prevail in a given case.
Leventhal, supra note 28, at 520. 57. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982) . The section reads: To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court shall-
(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be -(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law· (B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; (D) without observance of procedure required by law; (E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or (F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to a trial de novo by the reviewing court. In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error. 58. 401 U.S. at 414. 59. 401 U.S. at 415. One commentator has noted that while many courts have read the "presumption of regularity" language as signaling that the agency decision under review is sub· stantively correct, the more probable meaning of the phrase is that the Court will presume that this presumption does not shield the decision from a "thorough, probing, in-depth review." 60 Without explaining this apparent ambiguity, the Court then described the mechanics of review under the arbitrary and capricious standard. The initial inquiry is whether "on the facts the [agency's] decision can reasonably be said" to be within the agency's statutory range of choices. Second, the reviewing court must find that the actual decision was not "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law," 61 a test which is met if the decision was based on consideration of relevant factors and was not a "clear error of judgment." 62 Finally, the court must ensure that the agency complied with procedural requirements. 63 The lower courts have drawn upon the ambiguous terminology employed in Overton Park to support both a relatively deferential arbitrary and capricious standard 64 and a more rigorous reasonableness standard. 65 The use of Overton Park to support the arbitrary and capricious standard is fairly predictable given Overton Park's attempt to define the standard explicitly. Courts applying the arbitrary and capricious standard, however, risk overreliance on agency discretion in a context where the judicial check on agency action is particulary important. 66 More importantly, application of the arbitrary and capricious standard does not necessarily ensure systematic judicial review of an agency's compliance with NEPA's procedures.
The more persuasive cases are those applying Overton Park to support the reasonableness standard. Some of these cases have determined that review of the threshold EIS decision is governed by the first part of the Overton Park inquiry, which asks whether the decision is "reasonably" within the range of choices the agency is allowed by statute to make. 67 Others, apparently relying more on the second part the agency acted within its delegated authority and require a challenger to the agency action to assert more than unsupported allegations of error in order to prevail. [Vol. 85:191 of the Overton Park test, have applied the reasonableness standard to the type of discretion referred to in the "abuse of discretion" phrase of the arbitrary and capricious standard when reviewing threshold EIS decisions in light of NEP A's "mandatory requirements and high standards. " 68 At least two circuits that apply the reasonableness standard to the decision not to prepare an EIS rely on Overton Park to apply the less rigorous arbitrary and capricious standard to an agency's ultimate decision either to proceed with or to abandon an action based on a full weighing of environmental considerations in an EIS. 69 These cases treat the agency's decision not to prepare an EIS as potentially beyond its statutory range of legally permissible choices -a decision measured by reasonableness -and the agency's ultimate decision on whether to proceed with an action based on a completed EIS as one deserving greater judicial deference. The absence of a thorough weighing of environmental and nonenvironmental factors in an EA and the possibility that significant impacts might become apparent only after the completion of the detailed study involved in an EIS buttress the logic of applying these different tests to different agency decisions under NEPA. 7° Furthermore, the fact that Congress chose to influence substantive agency choices by requiring agencies to follow NEPA's procedures to the "fullest extent possible" 71 implies that agency discretion regarding those procedures is much narrower than agency discretion exercised after preparing an EIS. 72 Nonetheless, the vague term "reasonableness," while arguably ensuring that courts take an especially detailed look at threshold decisions under NEPA, fails to ensure that courts review agencies' compliance with NEPA's specific procedural requirements. The common failure of the "reasonableness" and "arbitrary and capricious" standards to ensure such compliance suggests that courts have given inadequate attention to the final part of the Overton Park test, which emphasizes judicial attention to procedural requirements. 73 More recently, courts using some version of the arbitrary and capricious standard have relied on the Supreme Court opinions in Kleppe While the Court made it clear that the ultimate merit decision based upon a weighing of these environmental considerations should be reviewed under the arbitrary, capricious, or abuse of discretion standard, a thorough study of Overton Park teaches that a more penetrating inquiry is appropriate for court-testing the entry·way determination of whether all relevant factors should ever be considered by the agency. The Kleppe review standard, however, cannot be extended to EIS threshold decisions. None of the parties in Kleppe argued that the impact of coal mining in the region would be insignificant. The appropriate extent of agency discretion in the decision at issue in Kleppewhether to prepare two EISs -is clearly greater than agency discretion to forgo preparing an EIS altogether. The latter decision effectively prevents any detailed environmental inquiry while the former merely concludes that one context for preparing an EIS is preferable to another. 78 Similarly, Baltimore Gas has been advanced in support of the arbitrary and capricious standard. 79 In Baltimore Gas, opponents challenged the agency's decision to ignore uncertainties in the environmental effects of nuclear waste storage. The agency assumed that such storage would result in no release of radiation to the environment but conceded that if the zero-release assumption was wrong, the environmental impacts would be significant. Nonetheless, the agency decided that the possibility of radiation release was too uncertain to factor into individual licensing decisions. The decision states broadly that the judicial role under NEPA is merely to ensure that agencies give adequate consideration to environmental factors and that 74 Cir. 1985) . In that case, while adopting the seemingly deferential arbitrary and capricious standard, the court nonetheless stated that "courts must play a cardinal role in the realization ofNEPA's mandate." 756 F.2d at 151.
See
(Vol. 85:191 their decisions are not arbitrary and capricious. 80 Reliance on Baltimore Gas to support a deferential arbitrary and capricious standard in the present context is not entirely appropriate. First, the case does not involve a threshold decision. 81 Second, and more significantly, the zero-release assumption was based on a set of documents that, for all practical purposes, already amounted to an EIS, 82 and thus the Court's review was more characteristic of review of EIS-type balancing than of EA-type determination of significance.
In short, the Supreme Court's failure to enunciate the proper standard of review for threshold EIS decisions has left courts without needed guidance in this area. The Court has established general principles recognizing that NEPA is essentially a procedural statute, 83 and that a court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency in reviewing NEPA decisions. 84 Similarly, the Court has stated that courts cannot compel agencies to give environmental considerations determinative weight 85 or require procedures beyond those required by NEPA 86 in their overall decisionmaking. Yet, neither these principles nor the cases decided in related areas have provided lower courts with a clear and workable standard for review. Instead, courts have apparently manipulated the vague terminology of Supreme Court cases resolving issues related to, but distinguishable from, the review of threshold decisions to support their predetermined standards of review.
B. Significant Impact: Question of Fact or Question of Law?
A court's choice to characterize the threshold decision as either factual or legal influences the degree of deference it will apply to the decision. Courts espousing the arbitrary and capricious standard tend to characterize the decision as primarily factual, thus warranting greater deference to agency discretion. Those The disagreement over characterization of the threshold decision as a question of law or of fact is illustrated by two early interpretations of NEPA. In Hanly v. Kleindienst, 88 business and residential members of a Manhattan neighborhood sought to enjoin the construction of a federal criminal detention center in the neighborhood until an EIS was prepared. The Second Circuit identified in the threshold decision both a question of law -the meaning of the term "significantly" -and a question of fact -whether an action will have a significant impact. 89 Although the Court recognized the "possible availability" of a reasonableness standard to review the mixed question of law and fact, 90 it relied on Overton Park, holding that the crucial, primarily factual determination of whether an action has a significant impact should be reviewed under the less demanding AP A arbitrary and capricious standard. 91 Importantly, the Hanly court found that the arbitrary and capricious standard "permits the agencies to have some leeway in applying the law to factual contexts in which they have expertise." 92 Similarly, other courts that apply this standard have been willing to defer to the agency's "good faith judgment."93
In Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 94 on the other hand, the Tenth Circuit held that because the EIS requirement is stated in mandatory terms, its applicability involves an essentially legal determination. 95 In that case, an environmental group chalimpact has no determinate meaning, and to interpret it sensibly ... requires a comparison that is also a prediction: whether the time and expense of preparing an environmental impact statement are commensurate with the likely benefits from a more searching evaluation than an environmental assessment provides. The nature of the required judgment explains why we have held that an agency's decision not to prepare an environmental impact statement will be set aside only if it is an abuse of discretion."), cert 100 Indeed, skeptics have concluded that courts usually characterize a decision as one of fact or law only after deciding the appropriate degree of judicial intervention. 101 
C. Burden of Proof Issues
In addition to the standard ofreview, courts have also disagreed on the closely related issue of what burden of proof must be imposed on the party challenging the agency decision not to prepare an EIS. 102 Specifically, courts have differed over whether a challenger must show (1) that an action will have a significant impact; 103 (2) that a substantial possibility exists that the action will have a significant impact; 104 I)n many situations it is difficult, perhaps indeed impossible, to make a clean distinction between fact and Jaw; that the difference is one of degree, that the relation of fact and law can be described as a spectrum with finding of fact shading imperceptibly into conclusion of Jaw.").
101. See, e.g., Peltz & Weinman, supra note 11, at 90 ("[l]t is naive to assume that courts determine the proper scope based upon whether they find the issue involved to be legal or factual. It is submitted that more often than not, courts attach the Jaw or fact label after they have determined what scope of review to employ.") (emphasis in original).
102. 106 Courts imposing an easier burden on challengers cite the possibility that significant environmental impacts may be revealed only after the preparation of a full-fledged EIS, and add that agency opponents required to meet a high burden of proof essentially would have to conduct their own EIS-type investigation to succeed. 107 The courts have also differed as to whether a challenger's satisfaction of the burden of proof is sufficient to compel preparation of an EIS 108 or whether it merely shifts the burden to the agency to prove the reasonableness of its decision. 109 Finally, one court requires the challenger to raise substantial issues not considered in the administrative record in order to satisfy the burden of proof, 110 essentially precluding review if the challenger merely attacks issues actually considered by the agency in making its decision. Because these differences over the burden of proof can significantly effect the outcome of challenges to agency FONSis, an attempt to resolve them is in order.
Ill. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO REVIEW OF THE EIS THRESHOLD DECISION
The divergent approaches the federal courts have developed for review of EIS threshold decisions, although given the conclusory labels "reasonableness" and "arbitrary and capricious," in fact range from a narrow to a broad review. Any approach must incorporate existing Supreme Court principles governing interpretation of NEP A. 111 However, because the cases the Court has decided involved situations in which the agencies had already given environmental factors at least some weight, those decisions do not provide sufficient guidance concerning review of the threshold decision. At the threshold stage, a reviewing court should be concerned whether environmental concerns, if they exist and are significant, will be given any weight at all beyond man, 521 F.2d 661, 673 (9th Cir. 1975 the cursory treatment in an EA. 112
The key problem with almost every existing judicial approach is the courts' insistence on using a single-step standard of review to scrutinize an agency's determination of environmental insignificance instead of examining the several decisions that make up the agency's determination. A more consistent judicial approach would focus scrutiny on agency compliance with NEPA procedures leading to the threshold decision, examining different points in the agency's analysis in order to determine the overall acceptability of the agency's decision. The four-part test developed by the District of Columbia Circuit provides a starting point for such an inquiry. 113 
A. The Test of the District of Columbia Circuit
The District of Columbia Circuit's approach to the review of an agency's decision not to prepare an EIS involves a four-part inquiry. First, the reviewing court must conclude that the agency took a "hard look" at the problem generally and did not simply make bald conclusions.114 In part, this portion of the inquiry reiterates the need for an adequate record, which is now also required by the CEQ regulations [i]ts supervisory function calls on the court to intervene not merely in the case of procedural inadequacies, or bypassing of the mandate in the legislative charter, but more broadly if the court becomes aware, especially from a combination of danger signals, that the agency has not really taken a "hard look" at the salient problems, and has not genuinely engaged in reasoned decision-making. If the agency has not shirked this fundamental task, however, the court exercises restraint and affirms the agency's action even though the court would on its own account have made different findings or adopted different standards.
• • . If satisfied that the agency has taken a hard look at the issues with the use of reasons and standards, the court will uphold its findings, though of less than ideal clarity, if the agency's path may be reasonably discerned, though of course the court must not be left to guess as to the agency's findings or reasons. 444 F.2d at 851 (footnotes omitted).
The "hard look" test was extended by the Supreme Court to decisions involving NEPA in Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976) ("The only role for a court is to insure that the agency has taken a 'hard look' at the environmental consequences ••.. "). See also Baltimore and judicial precedent. 115 Second, the agency must have identified the relevant areas of environmental concern, 116 a requirement inherent in those decisions requiring a challenger to allege factors not considered by the agency. 117 Third, the agency must make a "convincing case" for its finding that factors it did consider will have no significant impact. 118 Finally, the agency must show convincingly that any planned modifications in the proposed action will reduce the significance of impacts below that compelling preparation of an EIS. 11 9 The major strength of this test is that by questioning different steps in the agency's decision, it avoids substitution of the court's judgment for that of the agency, while exposing flaws in the agency's consideration of environmental concerns. Its weakness is its reliance on the vague "hard look" and "convincing case" tests. In the context of the EIS threshold decision, the term "hard look" is misleading in that the entire issue is whether the agency will indeed take the "hard look" inherent in the preparation of an EIS. Furthermore, courts must have a better sense of the most important points of inquiry in reviewing agency FONSis if the "convincing case" test is to provide a uniform basis for determining whether the agency has complied with NEP A's procedural mandates. The following proposed approach incorporates the strengths of the District of Columbia's test but provides a more standardized method of review.
B. A Proposed Systematic Standard of Review
This proposed approach for review of EIS threshold decisions identifies decisional factors that require heightened judicial scrutiny. The approach calls for courts to scrutinize the distinction between the EA and the EIS, the consistency of the agency's decision with other decisions of that agency and other agencies, the agency's use of post hoc rationalizations and proposed modifications, and the agency's treatment of scientific controversy and public opposition. The approach intentionally avoids conclusory labels such as "reasonableness," "arbitrary and capricious," "hard look," and "convincing case," and does not attempt to characterize the threshold decision as a [Vol. 85:191 question of fact or of law. Instead, it focuses judicial attention on agency compliance with NEP A's procedural mandates, 120 the key to the statute's substantive impact.
Concededly, the test requires rigorous judicial analysis of agency decisions and in that respect may be viewed as relatively nondeferential. A rigorous judicial analysis is 'favored by NEP A's mandatory terms, 12 1 the EIS requirement's applicability to all agencies -including those without expertise in environmental matters 122 -the pretermission of further environmental inquiry occasioned by a FONS!, 123 NEP A's lack of precise language or legislative history, 1 24 and the perpetual tension between primary agency concerns and environmental concerns in agency decisionmaking. 125 Furthermore, closer scrutiny parallels the reasoning of those courts applying the first step in the Overton Park analysis to the EIS threshold decision. 12 6 Various courts have given considerable weight to many of the factors incorporated in this approach. 127 Consistent testing of FONSis against all of these factors would greatly improve the uniformity of review in this area. The need for uniformity and the importance of a judicial check on administrative discretion in FONSis call for judicial resolution of the burden of proof issue as a starting point.
·Burden of Proof of a Challenger to an Agency FONS/
The initial goal of the reviewing court should be to ensure that those who challenge an agency's decision not to prepare an EIS demonstrate that there is a substantial possibility that the proposed action will significantly affect the environment. Since NEPA and the CEQ regulations clearly contemplate situations not requiring EISs, 128 challengers should be required to show more than a mere possibility that the action may have a significant impact; otherwise, an EIS will 120. Under the APA standards, the reviewing court is required to set aside agency decisions made "without observance of procedure required by law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(0) (1982 almost always be required. On the other hand, given the possibility that significant impacts might be revealed only after the detailed analysis an EIS entails, 129 the court should require less than a clear showing that the action will have a significant impact. Furthermore, courts that require the challenger to address issues not considered in the administrative record, in addition to inadequate treatment of issues that the agency did consider, should allow the challenger to rely on information both in and outside of the record. 130 The most sensible burden of proof for the challenger, therefore, is to raise a substantial possibility, not yet considered or inadequately addressed by the agency, that the action will have a significant impact on the environment.
Proper Distinction Between the EA and the EIS
The court should also ensure that the agency has not attempted to substitute an EA for an EIS. 131 The critical factors in making this determination are the length of the EA and the extent to which it balances relevant factors. 132 A long EA that discusses environmental concerns in detail should be considered highly suspect if used to support a FONS!, as it most likely indicates the existence of significant impacts and thus the need for an EIS. Courts suggesting that a detailed EA is often a substitute for an EIS 133 ignore the fundamental difference in the purposes of EAs and EISs. 134 (1986) . The court interpreted the role of the EA to be to determine "whether there is enough likelihood of significant environmental consequences to justify the time and expense of preparing an environmental impact statement," 764 F.2d at 449, and held that EAs are typically thorough enough to allow the court to apply a higher threshold of significance before requiring an agency to prepare an EIS. 764 F.2d at 451. Cf Maryland-Natl. Capital Park and Planning Commn. v. United States Postal Serv., 487 F.2d 1029, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("[l]n cases involving genuine issues as to health, and environmental resources, there is a relatively low threshold for impact statements ..•. "). In River Road Alliance, Judge Posner noted "evidence in the recent cases of a loosening of the judicial reins on agency decisions not to require environmental impact statements." 764 F.2d at 450. However, while accepting the legal realism inherent in his position -that courts today can allow an EA to do the work of an EIS because EAs are somehow more thorough today than in the past -Posner explicitly rejected consideration of the "realism about the danger of abuse" that exists when nonenvironmental agencies are forced statutorily to consider environmental concerns "to the fullest extent possible" in making decisions. [Vol. 85:191 be convertible into a sufficient EIS with little time and expense. 135 Furthermore, judicial refusal to allow EAs to substitute for EISs would most likely reduce the time and expense of litigation that is likely to result when EISs are not prepared in borderline cases.
Examination of the extent to which an EA balances factors is crucial in evaluating the validity of a FONS!. While an agency is free to recognize social and economic factors that favor an action, those factors can never justify the decision to forgo an EIS. Only after preparation of an EIS can an agency determine that economic and social factors outweigh significant environmental impacts and thereby justify a decision to proceed with an action.
Consistency with Other Decisions of the Agency
The court should allow challengers of the agency decision to present evidence that the agency required EISs for similar actions. If a pattern of significant environmental effects from a certain type of action is apparent, 136 the court should then impose a burden of persuasion on the agency to support its atypical decision not to prepare an EIS. A type of action that has never been considered by the agency should also trigger more skeptical review. 137 Conversely, an action that the agency has "categorically excluded," 138 in accordance with the CEQ regulations and its own internal procedures, should trigger greater deference to the agency's decision.
Consistency with Advice of Other Agencies
The problem with relying on agency discretion is intensified when the agency making the threshold EIS decision has primary concerns that conflict with environmental concems. 139 Both NEPA and the CEQ regulations thus contemplate interagency consultation prior to making the threshold decision. 140 Cir. 1985) (reviewing the National Institutes of Health's decision to approve the first deliberate release of genetically engineered recombinant-DNA-containing organisms, and noting the court's role in ensuring "that the bold words and vigorous spirit of NEPA are not .•• lost or misdirected in the brisk frontiers of science"); cf 40 C.F.R. § l501.4(e)(2)(ii) (1986) (requiring agencies, before deciding whether to prepare an EIS, to allow an extended public comment period for proposed FONSis relating to actions "without precedent").
138. See note 35 supra and accompanying text. 139. See note 28 supra and accompanying text. 140. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1982) ("Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal official shall consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has consider the advice of other agencies should be considered highly suspect, especially when a primarily nonenvironmental agency ignores the advice of an agency with expertise in environmental matters. 141
As a corollary, courts should permit challengers of the agency decision to attack any administrative record that does not include any references to advice obtained from environmental agencies. An agency that fails to obtain such information contravenes clear mandates from NEPA, the CEQ regulations, and, often, the agency's own regulations, 142 and thus commits a procedural error. 143
Post-hoc Rationalizations
Courts should be wary of an agency's use of "post-hoc rationalizations" to support a FONSI. 144 In the Overton Park decision, 145 the Supreme Court found that litigation affidavits used by the agency to explain its decision constituted an inadequate basis for review because they were not a reliable reflection of the agency's decisionmaking process.146 One circuit relied on this part of Overton Park to hold that an EA revised by an agency in response to a challenge of a decision not to prepare an EIS amounts to a post-hoc rationalization that the reviewing court must view critically and without deference to the agency. 147
Such nondeferential treatment of post-hoc rationalizations is proper because they are necessarily produced in an atmosphere of controversy which is likely to exacerbate any tension between the agency's possible development-oriented motives and environmental concerns.
jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved."); 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(b) (1985) ("The agency shall involve environmental agencies, applicants, and the public, to the extent practicable, in preparing assessments ... . ");cf. 33 C.F.R. § 230.9(c) (1986) (Corps of Engineers provision requiring EAs to include a list of agencies consulted during preparation of the EA, but not specifying that other agencies must be consulted).
Although the requirement to consult other agencies appears in NEPA in the section describing actual preparation of an EIS, at least one court has applied it to EA preparation. See Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 873 (1st Cir. 1985) ; see also Cir. 1985) .
[Vol. 85:191 Thus, the court must ensure that agency explanations given subsequent to an opponent's challenge were developed through proper reinspection of the relevant factors, such as by obtaining external advice, and not through adaptative reiteration of flawed reasoning.
Modifications
The courts have been unclear concerning the weight to give to planned project modifications that purport to reduce environmental impacts below the degree of significance triggering an EIS. 148 While the apparent consensus is that modifications should be able to support a decision not to prepare an EIS, 149 most courts have established that the mere promise that a modification will mitigate environmental impact is insufficient. 150 Otherwise, there is too great a possibility that the agency may subsequently alter the proposed modifications so that the significance of environmental impacts increases, and therefore that agencies could use possible mitigation measures as an excuse for sidestepping the EIS requirement. 151 In order to weigh modifications properly, a reviewing court should require that the agency be legally bound to carry out modifications reducing the significance of the action's environmental impact.152
Treatment of Controversy
Courts have disagreed over the proper treatment of scientific controvery about and public opposition to proposed actions. Both the CEQ regulations 15 3 and several internal agency procedures 154 identify "controversy" as one factor in determining the environmental signifi-cance of an action but fail to define the term adequately. Some courts, however, have made a sensible distinction between opposition and controversy. 155 According to these courts, opposition alone should not be sufficient cause for overturning or remanding a FONS! if the scientific community is in relative agreement over the potential effects of an action. 156 By contrast, these courts define controversy as existing when reasoned theories on the environmental impact of an action conflict. 157 In that case, courts should require the agency to make a stronger showing that an EIS is not needed to resolve the conflict.
The rationale for distinguishing opposition from controversy is that allowing public opposition alone to force agencies to prepare EISs surrenders the threshold decision to agency opponents. For example, courts should not require agencies to bend to opposition based on factors that are not legitimate subjects of the NEPA review process. 158 On the other hand, substantial disputes in the scientific community over the environmental impacts of an action logically indicate the need for more detailed study in an EIS.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the context of the decision to .forgo an EIS, "abuse of discretion" must be considered a flexible term, given that federal agencies with diverse and sometimes environmentally insensitive objectives are all subject to the same requirement to consider environmental factors [Vol. 85:191 in decisionmaking. The NEPA threshold decision is particularly susceptible to agency abuse because many federal agencies have primary development-oriented concerns inherently at odds with environmental considerations. Furthermore, because NEPA is designed to influence substantive agency decisions through procedural mandates, the judicial role in reviewing agency decisions to cut short those procedures must be especially rigorous.
A careful review of the different approaches for reviewing agency decisions not to prepare an EIS reveals that both the reasonableness and the arbitary and capricious standards fail to provide a consistent approach for reviewing FONSis. The goal in enunciating a proper standard should be to identify crucial points of inquiry for determining the appropriate degree of deference a court should give an agency determination that an action will have no significant impact. This Note outlines an approach that achieves that goal.
-Geoffrey Garver
